The contested impact of cognitive linguistic research on the psycholinguistics of metaphor understanding
Embodied metaphor understanding: recent experimental evidence
Imagining metaphorical actions
Consider the phrase “grasp the concept.” It is physically impossible to place one’s hands on an abstract entity such as a concept, yet people talk as if they do so all the time. Why is this so? One set of studies investigated whether people can form mental images for metaphorical phrases that refer to actions literally impossible to perform, such as “chewing on the idea,” “stretch for understanding,” and “cough up a secret” (Gibbs, Gould and Andric in press). The idea explored in these experiments was that people’s embodied metaphorical conceptualizations of abstract ideas should enable them to imagine the ways that abstract entities may be acted upon. Unlike imagining nonmetaphorical action statements (e.g., “chew on the gum”), where people’s images should focus on the procedural characteristics of the concrete actions (i.e., moving their mouths as they chew the gum), people’s mental images for metaphorical phrases should show an analogical understanding of how abstract domains, such as ideas or concepts, can be actively structured in terms of embodied source domains (i.e., chewing on something to get more out of it).
The results of a first study showed that when participants were presented specific phrases that were either metaphorical (e.g., “grasp the concept”) or nonmetaphorical (e.g., “grasp the branch”), given ten seconds to form a mental image of that action, and asked “What is particularly noticeable in your image?” they gave a wide variety of responses to this question, and these could be roughly divided into two groups. The first set of answers made some specific reference to the participants actually participating in the action. For example, when one participant was given the metaphorical phrase “chew on the idea,” she noted, “My jaw goes up and down as I chew.” People actually gave far more of these specific references to participating in the action responses for the nonmetaphors (63%) than to the metaphors (29%).
But for the metaphors, people gave significantly more conceptualized description of the action responses (71%) than they did for the nonmetaphors (37%). For instance, when one person was presented with the metaphor “stretch for understanding,” he said that the most noticeable thing in his image was “there is much stretching going in both in terms of the ideas being stretched out to see if they are true and me stretching to better see of examine the idea.” The participant essentially noted that IDEAS ARE OBJECTS which can be physically inspected, by stretching them out to more effectively examine them, and that UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING enables the person to extend his or her body to better control the object, and thus better understand it. This response provides an excellent example of how embodied metaphors constrain the mental images people construct when hearing metaphorical action statements.
When participants were next asked, “Why is this concept (e.g., idea) sometimes associated with this action (e.g., chewing)?” they gave two types of responses. The first set of responses focused on providing a concrete explanation of the relevant process or action. For instance, when one participant heard the nonmetaphorical phrase “chew on the gum.” she responded with “That is what you do with gum-chew on it.” But for the metaphors, people specifically provided an analogous, conceptual explanation as to why some concept was sometimes associated with some action or process. For example, for the metaphorical phrase “chew on the idea,” one person said “Chewing is related to a slow methodological activity and it could be related to turning something over in your mind to better understand it.” Overall, people gave analogous, conceptual explanations significantly more often to the metaphors (77%) than to the non-metaphors (36%). This result is as expected, assuming that people’s mental images for metaphorical action phrases are constrained by their embodied, metaphorical understandings of the target domains referred to in these expressions (e.g., ideas, concepts, feelings).
A second study more directly explored the possibility that people imagine metaphorical actions by engaging in embodied simulations of the actions referred to in the metaphorical statements. Participants once again heard different metaphorical and nonmetaphorical expressions, formed mental images for these phrases, and then answered a series of questions about their images. In Experiment 2, however, people also participated in one of three enactment conditions in which they first did one of three things: (a) watched the experimenter make a bodily action relevant to the main verb in each statement (e.g., making a stretching motion before forming a mental image for the phrase “stretch for understanding”), (b) watched the experimenter make a relevant bodily action, which they then imitated, before being given ten seconds to form their mental image for a phrase, or (c) watched the experimenter make a relevant bodily action, then imagined themselves doing the same action, before forming a mental image for the phrase. These three experimental treatments were referred to as the watching, imitating, and imagining conditions, respectively.
Analysis of the responses to the conceptual explanations for the metaphors, collapsed across all three enactment conditions, showed that 78% of these referred to additional bodily actions and consequences of these actions related to the main verb in each metaphorical phrase. This proportion was higher than that obtained in Experiment 1 (48%). For example, when one participant was given the phrase “put your finger on the truth” (in the imagine condition), she replied “I guess being able to touch the truth is an important thing, being able to relate to it, being able to actually see that it is a physical thing and can be examined.” This evidence reflects the product of the embodied simulation the participant constructed that made this impossible action plausible and meaningful.
The extent to which people ordinarily engage in imagistic processes during online metaphor comprehension is unclear. But the Gibbs et al. studies show that asking people to form explicit mental images for metaphoric and nonmetaphorical language can reveal significant differences in people’s intuitions about why these phrases have the specific meanings they do, including the important role of embodied metaphorical thought in constructing simulations of different metaphorical actions. Having people engage in different kinds of bodily action does not interfere with the creation of metaphorical images, but seems to highlight the imaginative reasons for why impossible metaphorical action phrases are meaningful and plausible.