Addressing the problems with prototype theory

The first problem we saw was the problem of prototypical primes, which relates to the unexpected typicality effects exhibited by ‘classical’ categories. Lakoff argues that this finding is not problematic for a prototype-based theory of cognitive models, because these effects can be explained by the nature of the cognitive model that underlies them. Recall that the integers 0–9 are generators: they have a privileged place in the category REAL NUMBER precisely because they form the basis of the category. Within this set, there is a submodel EVEN NUMBERS, which consists of numbers that can be divided by 2, and a sub model ODD NUMBERS for those that cannot. Lakoff argues that because a set of generators can metonymically stand for the category or model as a whole, then the generators included in the submodel ODD NUMBERS (the numbers 1, 3, 5, 7, 9) can stand for the entire category. Against this metonymic model, other odd numbers appear to be less representative of the category, resulting in typicality effects. Although the category ODD NUMBER remains a ‘classical’ category in the sense that it has definite rather than fuzzy boundaries, it still exhibits typicality effects, which Lakoff argues can be accounted for by the theory of cognitive models. Of course, if typicality effects were interpreted as a direct reflection of cognitive representation of categories, the findings of Armstrong et al.’s study would certainly be unexpected. This example goes some way towards explain ing why prototype theory cannot be straightforwardly translated into a model of cognitive representation.

The second problem we saw was the problem of ignorance and error. This relates to the idea that it is possible to possess a concept while not knowing or being mistaken about its properties. For example, a concept with prototype structure might incorrectly include an instance that is not in fact a member of that category, or incorrectly exclude instances that are a member of the category but fail to display any of the attributes that characterise the prototype. However, this problem only arises on the assumption that typicality effects are equivalent to cognitive representation. In other words, tendencies to categorise elderly women with grey hair and spectacles as members of the category GRANDMOTHER (when they might not be) or the failure to categorise sprightly blonde women as members of the category GRANDMOTHER (when they might be) arise from the social stereotype for GRANDMOTHER which can stand for the category as a whole. In Lakoff’s model, this is only one ICM among several for the category GRANDMOTHER, which means that both ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ instances of categorisation can be accounted for. Equally, it is possible to possess the concept WHALE while believing it is an instance of the category FISH rather than MAMMAL. Again, this can be accounted for on the basis of metonymic models. A typical property of fish is that they have fins and live in the sea while a typical property of mammals is that they have legs and live on land. Thus, based on the typicality of attributes within the ICM, a whale might be ‘miscategorised’ as a fish.

The third problem we saw relates to ‘missing prototypes’. According to this criticism, it should be possible to describe a prototype for any category we can conceive, yet it is not possible to describe a prototype for ‘unsubstantiated’ (non-existent) categories like US MONARCH and heterogeneous categories like OBJECTS THAT WEIGH MORE THAN A GRAM. Once more, this problem only arises on the assumption that typicality effects equate to cognitive representation. According to the theory of idealised cognitive models, categories like these are constructed ‘on-line’ from pre-existing cognitive models, like the ‘ad hoc’ categories we discussed earlier. Recall that ICMs are relatively stable knowledge structures that are built up on the basis of repeated experience: it is the non conventional status of non-existent and heterogeneous categories that predicts that such categories would be unlikely to exhibit typicality effects.

The final problem we saw related to compositionality: the criticism that prototype theory fails to provide an adequate explanation for the fact that complex categories do not reflect prototypical features of the concepts that contribute to them. For example, we saw that the category PET FISH does not represent prototypical attributes of the categories PET and FISH. Observe, however, that this criticism assumes that PET FISH is a straightforward composite of the meanings of the two conceptual categories PET and FISH. According to the cognitive model this concept has category structure independently of the two categories to which it is related. In other words, although a pet fish is a type of pet and a type of fish, experience of pet fish gives rise to an independently structured cognitive model in which the prototypical pet fish is the goldfish. The experiential basis of the cognitive model therefore explains why the attributes of this category differ from those of PET and FISH.

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مواضيع ذات صلة

Metaphor and metonymy

Categorisation and idealised cognitive models Summary

The structure of ICMs

Radial categories as a further source of typicality effects

Sources of typicality effects

The theory of idealised cognitive models

Problems with prototype theory

The horizontal dimension

The vertical dimension

The categorisation system

Principles of categorization

Prototype theory